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“SHIFTED SCIENCE” REVISITED: PERCOLATION 
DELAYS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS BASED ON OUTDATED SCIENCE 
CAITLIN M. PLUMMER & IMRAN J. SYED* 
ABSTRACT 
We previously wrote about the phenomenon of convictions based on science that 
is credible at the time of trial, but later comes to be repudiated.1 Such post-conviction 
shifts in science were most obvious and reprehensible in the very old cases, the 
example being a 1986 arson prosecution, whose scientific underpinnings are exposed 
in a post-conviction motion filed in 2011. Immediately upon completing that article, 
we came to realize that it told only half the story. We seek in this Article to build on 
that foundational idea of “shifted science” by discussing at length a harder question: 
the perception, percolation and continued evolution of shifts in science. We address 
here cases that arise on the cusp of a shift, identify the process of the shift in various 
forensic science disciplines and analyze how difficult it can be to perceive and 
address a shift in science, even when it occurs concurrently with, or even some time 
prior to, trial. Taking a step-by-step route through the process of significant shifts in 
several different forensic disciplines, we hope to clarify the many stages involved in 
these shifts and the important consequences of misperceiving shifts in science as 
they occur. Finally, we also lay a foundation for a later piece addressing the difficult 
question of legal avenues for relief in shifted science cases that arise on the cusp of a 
revolution, such as those we address here.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“Slow and painful has been man’s progress from magic to law.”2 
A. Background: The Enigma of Shifting Science  
In science, “[i]t is a truism that ‘error is inherent in research, and [scientific] 
validity is always conditional.’”3 But such “conditional validity” and “inherent error” 
are highly unpalatable to the legal system, that zealot of consistency and finality.4 
The issue is especially salient in criminal cases, where so much is on the line that 
any reasonable person may favor accuracy, yet the law’s insistence on finality still 
reigns.5 
                                                           
 2  Han Tak Lee v. Tennis, No. 4:08-CV-1972, 2014 WL 3894306, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 
13, 2014) (quoting proverb inscribed on a statue at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School).  
 3  George J. Annas, Scientific Evidence in the Courtroom: The Death of the Frye Rule, 
330 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1018, 1020 (1994) (quoting A.S. Relman & M. Angell, How Good Is 
Peer Review?, 321 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 827 (1989)). 
 4  See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (noting that “need for finality” 
in legal proceedings demands an “extraordinarily high” threshold for those seeking collateral 
review of their criminal convictions based on actual innocence). 
 5  See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, TAKING THE STAND: MY LIFE IN THE LAW 274 (2013) 
(lamenting that “anachronistic rules of finality . . . shut the courtroom doors to new scientific 
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Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the 
problem better than most in the odd detour he took in Jackson v. Pollion.6 In what 
was to be a routine opinion affirming denial of an inmate’s § 1983 civil rights action, 
Judge Posner dove headlong into a discussion on the regrettably troubled 
relationship between law and science.7 Quoting in turn five of the most significant 
jurists in American history (Judge Learned Hand, Judge Henry Friendly, Justice 
Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and Justice Antonin Scalia), 
Posner established beyond refute his contention: There is “a widespread, and 
increasingly troublesome, discomfort among lawyers and judges confronted by a 
scientific or other technological issue.”8 Posner also went on to correctly state why 
the disconnect ought to be disconcerting: “[I]t’s increasingly concerning, because of 
the extraordinary rate of scientific and other technological advances that figure 
increasingly in litigation.”9 
But, in the end, even Judge Posner’s apt observation tells only half the story. It 
cannot be denied, of course, that new technological advances and scientific 
knowledge make a world of difference in legal proceedings. Indeed, we have 
previously written about this very issue, analyzing how shifts in scientific thought 
and consensuses affect the justice of criminal convictions, which may well be based 
on outdated science, that occurred before the shift.10 But at the time we too limited 
ourselves to only telling half the story—for new technological and scientific 
advances are not the only thing the law is slow to recognize. Rather, the law is 
astonishingly inept at understanding, incorporating, and learning from even those 
shifts in scientific thinking that occurred years, perhaps even decades, before.  
B. The Process of the Shift—and What Comes After 
We seek in this Article to complete the circle by elaborating on the problem of 
shifted science that is yet to be widely recognized in the legal community, even 
where the “new” consensus is old news in the relevant scientific community. The 
practical question this Article addresses is: How might a defendant, convicted on the 
basis of science that was flawed, and the flaws could have been known at the time of 
his conviction, recognize the issues in his case and frame them properly in 
preparation for seeking post-conviction relief?  
Our focus here is on the percolation of knowledge of scientific advances, first 
within the scientific communities themselves and then, much later, within our legal 
system. It is easy enough to grasp that changes in scientific understanding and theory 
take some time to be accepted within the scientific community, and even longer to be 
perceived by the largely unscientific legal community. But there is much more 
gravity to that simple truth than our legal system has so far accounted for. This 
                                                           
developments that can both free the wrongly convicted and apprehend the guilty who remain 
at large”). 
 6  733 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 7  Id. at 787. 
 8  Id. at 787-88. 
 9  Id. at 788. 
 10  See generally Plummer & Syed, supra note 1. 
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Article is an attempt to document and explain the full scope of that unfortunate 
reality, as it has played out across a select few forensic science disciplines.  
The following four parts of this Article pull examples of the “shifted-but-not-yet-
understood” issue from four separate forensic disciplines. Each of these examples 
addresses what we call the “Percolation Problem,” where shifts in science take years 
to percolate down into the average courtroom—and the delay causes unjust 
convictions to continue for years after the science is recognized as flawed. 
Describing shifts pulled from the fields of fire science, comparative bullet lead 
analysis, and the medical diagnosis that was for years referred to as “Shaken Baby 
Syndrome,” this Article outlines some of the problems arising from delays in 
percolation of new scientific ideas into the local legal communities where criminal 
convictions occur. In so doing, this Article lays a framework for recognizing where 
particular cases fall within the percolation delay, which informs how prayers for 
relief may be structured.  
The tiny incremental steps in the journey of shifts in science are usually long 
forgotten by the time the end product is achieved. Nevertheless, we find that 
understanding the process of the shift is essential to appreciating the dynamism of 
science, which in turn is essential for fashioning a legal system that understands the 
materiality of shifts in science and accounts for them in the post-conviction avenues 
it makes available. In the four parts that follow, we undertake a far deeper review of 
the process of the shift than in our previous work. Because, when it comes to seeking 
relief based on late percolating shifts in science, the devil is in the details of when 
certain science changed, and when practitioners within the relevant scientific fields, 
lawyers, courts, and most importantly, defendants, could or should have become 
aware of the changes.  
Finally, how one actually obtains relief based on shifts in science is, of course, 
the all-important underlying question of the research and analysis we have 
undertaken. Yet, because we intend to focus here on the process of the shift, 
recognizing it and realizing where a particular case might fall within it, we make 
only minimal discussion of legal remedies in this Article. Such a discussion, to be 
more than merely cursory regurgitation of existing understanding, demands a full 
article in itself—one we have forthcoming.  
I. FIRE SCIENCE—PHYSICAL MARKERS ATTRIBUTED TO ARSON 
Andrew Babick was convicted in November 1996 of arson and felony murder for 
a house fire that occurred in September 1995 in Battle Creek, Michigan.11 The 
question of whether and how his case is affected by the fire science revolution 
ushered in with the 1992 advent the National Fire Protection Association’s 
(“NFPA”) NFPA 921: Guide for Fire & Explosion Investigations12 is a complex one, 
and it seemed almost impossible to resolve when initially brought before us.13 
                                                           
 11  People v. Babick, No. 207638, 1999 WL 33437948, at *1, 5 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 
1999). 
 12  NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION 
INVESTIGATIONS (1st ed. 1992) [hereinafter NFPA 921]. 
 13  The authors worked on Babick’s case at the Michigan Innocence Clinic at the 
University of Michigan Law School. Michigan Innocence Clinic Secures New Trial in Arson-
Murder Case, U. MICH. L. SCH. NEWS (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.law.umich.edu/ 
newsandinfo/features/Pages/Michigan-Innocence-Clinic-Secures-New-Trial-in-Arson-
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Resolved it was, and in a manner most fortunate for Babick,14 but let us start at the 
beginning. 
A. Deadly House Fire15 
On the evening of September 8, 1995, Babick visited a drug house to purchase 
crack cocaine.16 After returning a second time to make another purchase, he was told 
that the dealer was not there, so Babick waited on the porch for the dealer to return.17 
During that time, he smoked a cigarette and fell asleep on the couch on the porch.18 
Waking up shortly afterward, Babick could not find his cigarette.19 Seeing that the 
dealer had still not returned, Babick ambled home.20  
A fire consumed the drug house shortly after Babick’s departure.21 Two adults 
escaped from the burning home, but two children died.22 Babick was arrested and 
charged with felony murder for intentionally setting the fire, allegedly because he 
was angry with the dealer.23 
No one saw Babick set the fire.24 He had no traces of gasoline on him,25 and there 
was no explanation given of how he had acquired or transported gasoline.26 There 
                                                           
Murder-Case.aspx.  
 14  Trace Christenson, Andrew Babick Wins New Trial in ‘95 Arson-Murder, BATTLE 
CREEK ENQUIRER (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.battlecreekenquirer.com/story/news/local/2014/ 
11/07/andrew-babick-wins-new-trial-arson-murder/18647607.  
 15  Throughout the discussion of the Babick case, we cite mostly to the trial transcripts of 
the Babick case (on file with the authors) because, knowing the case as we do, we deem the 
evidence actually presented to the jury to be the best true statement of the record of the case, 
as opposed to haphazard summarizations made by the various courts on appeal. However, 
because trial transcripts are not readily available to the reader, where possible, we do also 
include secondary citations to appellate opinions. 
 16  Transcript of Jury Trial Vol. 3 at 66, People v. Babick, No. 96-2562FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. 
1996) [hereinafter Babick TT3]; Transcript of Jury Trial Vol. 5 at 21, People v. Babick, No. 
96-2562FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1996) [hereinafter Babick TT5]; see also Babick v. Berghuis, 620 
F.3d 571, 574 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 17  Transcript of Jury Trial Vol. 4 at 51-52, People v. Babick, No. 96-2562FC (Mich. Cir. 
Ct. 1996) [hereinafter Babick TT4]; see also Babick, 620 F.3d at 574. 
 18  Babick TT4, supra note 17, at 52, 56; see also Babick, 620 F.3d at 574.  
 19  Babick TT5, supra note 16, at 49; see also Babick v. Berghuis, No. 1:03-cv-20, 2008 
WL 282166, at *66 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2008). 
 20  Babick TT4, supra note 17, at 56; see also Babick, 2008 WL 282166, at *2. 
 21  Babick TT3, supra note 16, at 73-74; see also Babick, 620 F.3d at 574.  
 22  Babick TT3, supra note 16, at 73-75; see also Babick, 620 F.3d at 574. 
 23  Transcript of Jury Trial Vol. 6 at 18, People v. Babick, No. 96-2562FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. 
1996) [hereinafter Babick TT6] (“So he sat there long enough to stew about it, smoking his 
cigarette, finally decided, oh, hell with it, so he grabbed gas can right in front of him at the 
barbecue and started pouring.”); id. at 22; id. at 91-93 (trial court instructing jury on specific 
charges); see also Babick, 620 F.3d at 574-75. 
 24  Babick TT6, supra note 23, at 5-34 (prosecutor summarizing all of the evidence 
presented against Babick, which includes no mention of anyone seeing him set the fire). 
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was no explanation for how he got into the house, and why no one in the house heard 
him, despite the allegation that he spread gasoline only a few feet away from the 
inhabitants.27 Babick insisted he did not set the fire.28 Nevertheless, the State 
concluded that he broke into the house, poured gasoline throughout, and ignited it.29 
And the State had no trouble convincing the jury about that version of events,30 
because “science” was on its side. 
At trial the State’s case consisted of two vital lines of scientific argument. The 
first was based on the physical markers present at the fire scene, testified to by two 
fire investigators, Wayne Etue and Joan Tuttle.31 They stated that present in the 
house were “liquid pour patterns” on the floor, suspicious “even burning” on the 
stairs, an abundance of “low burning” and “deep burning” into the carpet, and 
evidence of especially intense, extremely high temperature burning.32 The experts 
testified that all of these things were unmistakable markers of arson.33 Specifically, 
they said that the evidence showed that someone had walked into the house, poured 
gasoline in various places, including the living room, stairs and upstairs landing, and 
then ignited the accelerant.34 Indeed, reading what was then often called the 
                                                           
 25  Babick TT5, supra note 16, at 61-63, 67-69 (chemist affirming that all clothing and 
shoes taken from Babick tested negative for accelerants in the lab; one pair of shoes indicated 
a possible positive, but the chemist indicated that was due to contamination in her lab).  
 26  See Babick, 620 F.3d at 584 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (quoting county prosecutor’s letter 
admitting, “[T]here is no evidence that connects Mr. Babick to accelerants. The only evidence 
that shows he had contact with accelerants in his footwear and this is weak evidence at best. 
There is no evidence nor explanation of where the charcoal lighter fluids or kerosenes came 
from.”). 
 27  Babick TT6, supra note 23, at 38, 41, 44-46. Additionally, the state court of appeals, 
undertaking what it called a “thorough” review of the case against Babick, outlined in its 
opinion all the evidence of guilt presented against Babick. People v. Babick, No. 207638, 
1999 WL 33437948, at *5-6 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1999). The evidence did not include 
any eyewitnesses or explanations for how the gasoline was acquired and transported, or how 
Babick gained entry into the house and allegedly spread the gasoline without being noticed.  
 28  Babick TT6, supra note 23, at 54; see also Babick v. Berghuis, No. 1:03-CV-20, 2008 
WL 282166, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2008) (“[P]etitioner vehemently denied having started 
the fire . . . .”). 
 29  Babick TT6, supra note 23, at 8, 17-20. 
 30  Transcript of Jury Trial Vol. 7 at 9-12, People v. Babick, No. 96-2562FC (Mich. Cir. 
Ct. 1996) [hereinafter Babick TT7]. 
 31  Transcript of Jury Trial Vol. 1 at 196, People v. Babick, No. 96-2562FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. 
1996) [hereinafter Babick TT1]; Transcript of Jury Trial Vol. 2 at 46, People v. Babick, No. 
96-2562FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1996) [hereinafter Babick TT2]; see also Babick, 1999 WL 
33437948, at *5. 
 32  Babick TT1, supra note 31, at 208-19; Babick TT2, supra note 31, at 8-13, 52-59, 62-
64; see also Babick v. Berghuis, 620 F.3d 571, 581-82 (6th Cir. 2010) (Merritt, J., dissenting); 
Babick, 2008 WL 282166, at *25-26. 
 33  Babick TT2, supra note 31, at 9, 52-54. 
 34  See supra note 31.  
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“fingerprint of arson,”35 the two experts claimed even to be able to read and follow 
the particular pour trail left by Babick as he spread the gasoline through the house.36 
The second line of scientific argument was based on the alerts given at the scene 
by an accelerant-detection canine.37 The dog’s handler, Jeff Austin, testified that the 
dog alerted in various places throughout the house, and that her alerts were direct 
evidence that an accelerant was used in those locations.38 Austin went so far as to say 
that his dog was “100% correct every time”39 and her nose was 1,000 times more 
sensitive than laboratory equipment used to detect gasoline.40 The latter statement 
was necessary because lab testing failed to detect the presence of gasoline on any of 
the debris samples taken from inside the house.41 The prosecutor asked the jury to 
overlook that fact, stating, “a dog’s nose on a trained dog is a mystical thing . . . a 
thousand times more sensitive than the lab equipment.”42 
In light of that dynamic duo of scientific implication and insinuation, Babick’s 
defense team faced a severe uphill battle. Given that juries often attribute a “mystic 
infallibility” to scientific evidence presented in court,43 a defendant’s options are 
inevitably limited when confronted with a situation where (not just one but) two 
lines of scientific argument, and multiple scientific experts, heavy handedly negate 
any possibility of innocence or mitigation.44 Babick maintained his innocence, but 
because the experts seemed to decisively conclude that the fire was arson, his 
attorney did not even bother with a “not-arson” defense, and tried instead to just 
point the finger at possible alternative arsonists.45 
                                                           
 35  See, e.g., INNOCENCE PROJECT, INNOCENCE NETWORK EXONERATIONS 7 (2012), 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/files/imported/innocence_network_2012.pdf (stating in the 
case of David Lee Gavitt that the scientific evidence known as the “fingerprint of arson” are 
outdated indicators of arson that no scientific basis); see also Babick TT1, supra note 31, at 
219 (Tuttle speaking of “characteristic footprint from accelerant . . . .”). 
 36  Babick TT2, supra note 31, at 27-28, 52, 54. 
 37  Babick TT4, supra note 17, at 85-89; see also Babick, 2008 WL 282166, at *31, *50. 
 38  See supra note 37. 
 39  Babick TT4, supra note 17, at 81. 
 40  Babick v. Berghuis, 620 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2010) (Merritt, J., dissenting); see also 
Babick TT4, supra note 17, at 84 (“Lab equipment used to check fire debris will detect parts 
per million and the canine can detect parts per billion. So that’s how much more sensitive she 
is than the equipment.”). 
 41  Babick, 620 F.3d at 580-81 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 42  Babick TT6, supra note 23, at 19-20. 
 43  United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 44  E.g., United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 113 (D. Mass. 2010) (“Just because 
the testimony has been admitted sends the jury the message that the opinions are entitled to 
some weight.”) (citing N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect, 15 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1, 12 (2009) (“[J]urors assume that judges review scientific 
evidence before it is presented to them, and that any evidence used in a trial must be above 
some threshold of quality. Because of these assumptions, jurors seem to be less critical of 
scientific evidence used in trials and are more persuaded by it.”)). 
 45  Babick v. Berghuis, No. 1:03-CV-20, 2008 WL 282166, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 
2008) (“[T]he record does not support the conclusion that [Babick]’s trial counsel pursued a 
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The strategy failed. Babick was convicted46 and sentenced in December 1996 to 
life in prison without the possibility of parole47—the most severe punishment 
permitted in Michigan, given that the state outlawed the death penalty nearly two 
centuries ago.48 His direct appeal was denied by the state court of appeals in 1999,49 
and higher courts denied his applications and petitions for relief.50 As far as the law 
was concerned, Babick’s story was over.  
But science was already working on a sequel. 
B. A Revolution in the Backdrop 
Unbeknownst to Babick or his defense counsel was the fact that the very sort of 
evidence the State was using to convict him was being invalidated even as his trial 
proceeded. Since the late 1980s, a select group of fire investigators had begun to 
question the conventional wisdom that went into the diagnosis of arson in cases like 
Babick’s.51 Did intense low burning necessarily mean the fire was fueled by a liquid 
accelerant such as gasoline? Were those patterns on the floor only present when 
accelerants had been poured? And did canines really have some mystical ability to 
sniff out accelerants where even lab tests failed to detect them? Slowly, and 
sometimes by sheer happenstance,52 the answers began to be revealed—and they 
were shocking. 
                                                           
theory of accident at trial. Instead, the record indicates that counsel pursued only the theory 
that her client was not the perpetrator . . . .”). 
 46  Babick TT7, supra note 23, at 9-10. 
 47  Transcript of Sentencing at 18, People v. Babick, No. 96-2562FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1996).  
 48  MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 46 convention cmt. (“[O]ur state has not had the death penalty 
since 1846.”). Ironically, perhaps, Michigan outlawed the death penalty specifically out of the 
fear that an innocent person might be executed. See Eugene G. Wagner, Michigan and Capital 
Punishment, MICH. B.J., Sept. 2002, at 39 (noting that shortly before banning capital 
punishment in 1846, “in about 1840, Michiganians learned that the Canadians had hanged an 
innocent man three years before just across the river in what is now Windsor, the true culprit 
later having made a death-bed confession of his guilt.”). 
 49  People v. Babick, No. 207638, 1999 WL 33437948, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 
1999). 
 50  Babick v. Berghuis, 563 U.S. 948 (2011); Babick v. Berghuis, 620 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 
2010); Babick v. Berghuis, No. 1:03-CV-20, 2008 WL 282166 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2008); 
People v. Babick, 610 N.W.2d 916 (Mich. 2000); People v. Babick, 614 N.W.2d 588 (Mich. 
2000). 
 51  JOHN J. LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS IN FIRE INVESTIGATION 13 (2d ed. 2013) 
[hereinafter LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS]. 
 52  See, e.g., id. at 483 (“The lines of demarcation seen in a 1992 test fire in Tucson, Arizona . . 
. gave pause to the author and his colleagues conducting the test. No efforts were made to produce 
the pattern (later used in NFPA 921), but it looked to all present like something resembling a 
flammable liquid pour pattern had been created.”); see also John Lentini, Fire Expert: How I 
Nearly Sent a Man to the Electric Chair, ABC NEWS (May 6, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/2020/ 
john-lentinis-fire-arson-investigation/story?id=10562869&singlePage=true (explaining that the 
prevalence of flashover, and its significant impact on compartment fires, was discovered 
accidentally by Lentini in his attempt to prove a defendant’s guilt in a 1992 Jacksonville, Florida, 
case).  
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1. Roots of Revolution53 
The story of the revolution in fire science is best told by John J. Lentini, who was 
among its chief catalysts54 and is certainly its most recognized documenter.55 In his 
book Scientific Protocols in Fire Investigation Lentini notes that as a profession, 
“[f]ire investigation developed on a parallel track” from advances in fire science, and 
“until the mid-1980s, very little of the newly discovered knowledge about the 
behavior of fire was passed on to fire investigators.”56 
While investigators in the field may have remained largely oblivious, “[t]he 
early-1980s were years of decisive change” in the understanding of fire behavior.57  
For the first time, computers were able to come to grips with the 
complexities of simultaneously modeling fluid dynamics, heat transfer, 
mass loss, and chemistry. . . . As cheaper and faster computers became 
generally available, more individuals had the ability to learn how to 
model fires. In addition to the computational advances, there were 
technological advances in the study and measurement of real fires. 
. . . . 
In 1984, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) released 
Countdown to Disaster, a 16-minute videotape of a test fire that mimicked 
the behavior of an ordinary residential fire involving an upholstered chair. 
The spectacular flashover that occurred is still used to illustrate how 
compartment fires behave in a manner entirely beyond the comprehension 
of anyone who has not personally witnessed the phenomenon. Countdown 
to Disaster destroyed the simple “heat rises” concept that many fire 
                                                           
 53  We previously avoided a wholesale analysis of the specifics of when and how the 
actual shift in fire science occurred, and chose instead to just briefly describe its results. See 
Plummer & Syed, supra note 1, at 271-75. However, it is necessary to have a fuller discussion 
here because the intricacies of the advanced subset of the shifted science conundrum that we 
engage in in this Article demand a more searching analysis of the subtleties of the science and 
the path of its advancements. If we avoided such discussions here (and in upcoming 
subsections below), we would be making the very mistake for which Judge Posner chided the 
legal profession in Jackson. 
 54  See, e.g., Steve Kroft, Arizona’s Pioneer Hotel Fire Re-examined, 60 MINUTES (Mar. 
31, 2013) at 10:04, http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/arizonas-pioneer-hotel-fire-re-examined 
(“[Lentini] has conducted more than 2,000 fire investigations, and has been at the center of the 
most important developments in fire investigations over the past 30 years.”).  
 55  E.g., LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 51; John J. Lentini, The Evolution of 
Fire Investigation and Its Impact on Arson Cases, 27 CRIM. JUST., Spring 2012, at 12, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_magazine/sp12_fi
re_investigation.authcheckdam.pdf; John J. Lentini, A Calculated Arson, FIRE & ARSON 
INVESTIGATOR, Apr. 1999, at 20; John J. Lentini et al., Unconventional Wisdom: The Lessons 
of Oakland, FIRE & ARSON INVESTIGATOR, June 1993, at 18; John J. Lentini et al., Baseline 
Characteristics of Residential Structures Which Have Burned To Completion: The Oakland 
Experience, 28 FIRE TECH. 195 (1992). 
 56  LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 51, at 10. 
 57  Id. at 11. 
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investigators used (and some, unfortunately, still use) to determine the 
origin of fires.58 
2. The Forging of NFPA 921: A New Way of Doing Things 
Noting “the perception of a profession plagued by misconceptions,” the 
Standards Council of the NFPA formed a Technical Committee on Fire 
Investigations in 1985.59 “After 7 years, the first edition of NFPA 921, Guide for 
Fire and Explosion Investigations, was released.”60 Intended to “assist in improving 
the fire investigation process and the quality of information on fires resulting from 
the fire investigation process,”61 NFPA 921 “is currently updated every 3 or 4 years” 
and “is the single most important treatise ever published in the field of fire 
investigation.”62 
The exact changes to the fire investigation profession wrought by NFPA 921 
were truly substantial. Nearly all of them were based on a new understanding of the 
phenomenon called flashover, which NFPA 921 describes as: 
A transition phase in the development of a compartment fire in which 
surfaces exposed to thermal radiation reach ignition temperature more or 
less simultaneously and fire spreads rapidly throughout the space, 
resulting in full room involvement or total involvement of the 
compartment or enclosed space.63  
. . . .  
This transition is generally characterized as the transition from “a fire in a 
room” to “a room on fire.”64 
With flashover revealed as a prominent player in potentially every compartment 
fire, fire scientists began to note that many of the physical artifacts previously 
thought to only occur in arson fires could actually occur in innocent fires that have 
reached flashover.65 NFPA 921 noted that physical markers—such as alligatoring of 
wood,66 crazed glass,67 depth and location of char,68 lines of demarcation in the burn 
                                                           
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. at 13. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. (quoting NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION 
INVESTIGATIONS 1 (7th ed. 2011)). 
 62  Id. 
 63  NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS 
§ 3.3.78 (7th ed. 2011). 
 64  Id. at § 5.10.4.1. 
 65  JOHN D. DEHAAN & DAVID J. ICOVE, KIRK’S FIRE INVESTIGATION 270 (7th ed. 2012) 
(“Such a burn by itself does not mean that a fire is incendiary in origin . . . . Something normal 
to the room may have caused it to burn in this fashion, such as combustible floor coverings, 
post-flashover burning, falldown or collapse. Each possible hypothesis has to be tested and 
eliminated.”). 
 66  LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 51, at 474. 
 67  Id. at 478. 
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patterns,69 sagged furniture springs,70 spalled concrete,71 low burning and holes in 
the floor,72 and time and temperature of the fire73—were vastly misunderstood prior 
to the understanding of flashover.74 Previously, the presence of one or more of these 
markers would have led to a quick conclusion that the fire was arson, but flashover 
deepened the narrative. Given that the same physical markers could be present in 
both accidental and arson fires, investigators needed more than just those physical 
markers to make a call of arson.75 Forced to reconcile with the basics of good police 
investigation—such as evaluation of motive, means, opportunity, personality and 
context—the fire investigation profession became more discerning over time, as 
knowledge of NFPA 921 and its requirements percolated down into every corner of 
the field.  
It is to that all-important, but often-ignored, period of percolation that we now 
turn our attention. 
3. Delayed Percolation: Spreading the Word, Holdouts and Relapses 
As Lentini notes, the advancements in scientific knowledge codified in the initial 
and successive editions of NFPA 921, were not immediately or universally accepted 
and implemented: “To say that the early editions of NFPA 921 were not universally 
embraced by the fire investigation community would be a serious understatement.”76  
As with any new standard, NFPA 921 aroused the ire of those accustomed 
to working to their own subjective criteria. In 1999, these individuals 
organized a write-in campaign that urged the NFPA to delete any 
reference to science in the document. Part of the driving force behind this 
campaign was the 11th Circuit Court decision called Michigan Millers 
Mutual v. Benfield. In that case, the appeals court upheld the exclusion of 
an investigator’s testimony and held that because the investigator stated 
that he was knowledgeable in fire science, the admissibility of his 
testimony was subject to Daubert challenge. This ruling sent shudders 
through the world of fire investigation. Certain leaders of the fire 
investigation community began urging fire investigators to avoid any 
mention of the word “science” and thus avoid the Daubert challenge that 
it might bring. An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of the 
International Association of Arson Investigators, which argued that 
“Cause and origin investigations, by their very nature, are ‘less scientific’ 
                                                           
 68  Id. at 481. 
 69  Id. at 482. 
 70  Id. at 489. 
 71  Id. at 490. 
 72  Id. at 498. 
 73  Id. at 501. 
 74  Id. at 474. 
 75  See DEHAAN & ICOVE, supra note 65, at 269-70. 
 76  LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 51, at 13. 
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than envisioned by Daubert,” essentially asking that the Court 
“grandfather” the folly that “traditional” methods represented.77  
The United States Supreme Court, in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, declined the 
invitation by the old school to deem that certain types of expert testimony lie outside 
the scope of Daubert.78 Instead, the Court “held unanimously that Daubert applied to 
all expert testimony, and Rule 702 made no relevant distinction between ‘scientific 
knowledge’ and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge.”79 Despite the 
Supreme Court’s authoritative declaration, the old school of fire investigation did not 
give up: “[M]ore than a hundred comments were submitted to the NFPA for the 
2001 edition, protesting the Technical Committee’s decision to continue to 
recommend the use of the scientific method.”80  
Thus, since the initial understanding of flashover emerged in the 1980s and even 
since the initial edition of NFPA 921 was released in 1992, much confusion, 
disagreement, and outright insubordination remained. Like Lentini, David M. 
Smith—a fire scientist with more than forty years of experience, who has been a 
member of the NFPA Technical Committee on Fire Investigations since 199281—
witnessed many of the percolation delays first hand. Smith notes that even after the 
initial publication of NFPA 921, “it would be many years—in some cases, up to a 
decade or more—before knowledge of NFPA 921 would percolate down to the 
relevant investigative communities in various parts of the country.”82  
Law enforcement officials in particular attempted to hold out from NFPA 921:  
As a member of the NFPA 921 technical committee at that time, I 
received and reviewed countless comments from members of the 
Michigan State Police and Fire Marshal’s Bureau. Most involved a 
request to simply withdraw or cancel the document since it was contrary 
to the methods they used and taught. Other comments from the Michigan 
State Fire Marshal and the Michigan State Police challenged supposed 
“misconceptions” in NFPA 921, but failed to provide any documentation 
or testing to support their objections.83  
 
                                                           
 77  Id. (citing Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 1998); 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Burke, P.W., Amicus curiae Brief 
Filed on Behalf of the International Association of Arson Investigators in Michigan Millers). 
 78  526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 79  LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 51, at 13-14. 
 80  Id. at 14.  
 81  David M. Smith, ASSOCIATED FIRE CONSULTANTS, http://assocfire.com/david-m-smith 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2016).  
 82  Affidavit of David M. Smith at ¶ 27, People v. Babick, No. 96-2562FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. 
June 17, 2013) (on file with authors) (citing LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 51, at 
15 (noting that NFPA 921 did not become “generally accepted” by the fire investigation 
community until the year 2000)). 
 83  Id. at ¶ 29. 
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That law enforcement officials in particular resisted the change is important 
because law enforcement agencies, like the state police and fire marshal, are 
generally the ones who hold local trainings and teach fire investigation concepts and 
methods to other investigators, prosecutors and defense attorneys.84 Therefore, as 
law enforcement agencies held out, there would logically be an even more 
pronounced delay in percolation of NFPA 921 teachings. As Smith notes,  
Only since the early 2000’s has the scientific method embodied in NFPA 
921 come to be generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. 
Specifically, the execution of Cameron Todd Willingham in 2004 was the 
first major event that exposed the old myths of the fire investigation 
profession to the general public. Only after that point did non-scientists 
really begin to appreciate the importance of the decisive shift in 
methodology and paradigm that the fire investigation profession was 
undergoing.85 
The period between 1992 (when NFPA 921 was first released and officially 
debunked myths about the physical markers of arson, such as those used to convict 
Babick) and 2004 (when knowledge of the scientific shift had percolated enough to 
begin reaching those outside of the relevant scientific community) was thus a 
dangerous no-man’s land: The old ways persisted, the new ways existed, and the 
average defendant and attorney remained oblivious to the differences. 
It was in that no man’s land that Andrew Babick’s case arose. But that was not 
even the only scientific albatross his defense faced. There was a second significant 
scientific shift that would have changed the very paradigm upon which the State 
built its case against Babick: Accelerant detecting canines. 
II. A PARALLEL REVOLUTION IN FIRE SCIENCE: CANINE-ACCELERANT ALERTS 
A. “Dog said it. I believe it. That settles it.”86 
As if arising during the transition stage of the percolation of NFPA 921 did not 
create enough of a challenge for Babick’s defense, there was also the matter of 
shifting consensus on canine hydrocarbon alerts. This shift occurred separately from 
the shift in scientific consensus on physical markers of arson: in fact, canine 
evidence was not mentioned at all in the 1992 or 1995 editions of NFPA 921.87 
                                                           
 84  For example, Babick’s trial attorney testified at the 2014 evidentiary hearing that, prior 
to her representation of Babick, she had been trained in fire science by the Michigan State 
Police Fire Marshal Division, and that training had given her no knowledge of NFPA 921. 
Transcript of Video Evidentiary Hearing at 6-8, 42-43, People v. Babick, No. 96-2562FC 
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 2014) (on file with authors). 
 85  Smith, supra note 82, at ¶ 33. 
 86  LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 51, at 526 (describing the traditional 
attitude of canine handlers toward canine accelerant alerts).  
 87  The 1995 edition of NFPA 921 did seemingly anticipate the coming shift in accelerant-
detection canine evidence, noting on an introductory page that: “The committee is continuing 
its work, and future editions will include information on . . . the use of canines in the detection 
of accelerants.” NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS 
INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2d ed. 1995). Other than that passage, however, there was not another 
mention of canines in the entire 1995 edition of NFPA 921.  
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Instead, as the 1995 edition of NFPA 921 went to print, the official position of the 
relevant scientific community on canine accelerant alerts was what it had been for a 
decade or more: trained dogs have a mystical ability to detect accelerants at fire 
scenes, even where lab testing fails to show anything.88  
Indeed, in 1995, the then-latest edition of the leading fire investigation treatise 
Kirk’s Fire Investigation advised that canine alerts, even without lab confirmation, 
can be “accepted as proof of the presence of accelerants.”89 Babick’s attorney at his 
November 1996 trial thus had no real way to contest the prosecution’s claim that 
gasoline was present on the debris samples taken from the house. Even though lab 
testing failed to confirm the canine accelerant alerts, the State could, and certainly 
did, argue that there was gasoline present in the debris at the fire scene.90 
However, a major change in science was occurring at virtually the exact same 
time as Babick’s trial.  
B. Seeds of Change: State of Georgia v. Weldon Wayne Carr 
An April 7, 1993, fire at the home of Georgia millionaire Weldon Wayne Carr 
was perhaps the single most crucial event that led to the exposure of considerable 
flaws in traditional beliefs about canine accelerant alerts and the move toward 
reform.91 Carr was immediately suspected of arson and arrested days later.92 The 
prosecutor on the case, Nancy Grace, brought to the table an unflinching assumption 
of Carr’s guilt, and a dogged determination to see him convicted.93 Had Carr been 
the average indigent defendant, his case may well have gone the Babick route of 
conviction and decades of incarceration. However, Carr had the resources to fund the 
retention of top-notch experts and attorneys,94 and was able to litigate his defense to 
                                                           
 88  See, e.g., supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. In another context, the Illinois 
Supreme Court, a bit ahead of its time, noted the practice of attributing “superstitious awe” to 
the alleged capabilities of a dog’s nose. People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 662 (1994) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 89  JOHN D. DEHAAN, KIRK’S FIRE INVESTIGATION 135 (3d ed. 1991). 
 90  Babick TT6, supra note 23, at 18 (With respect to accelerant, prosecutor argued, 
“[w]ho cares where it came from? We know it was there.”). 
 91  See, e.g., LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 51, at 518-34. 
 92  Id. at 519. 
 93  See id. (noting that when the state crime lab failed to find presence of accelerants in 
chemical testing of fire debris, Grace went to the trouble of commissioning a private lab to do 
new tests); id. at 529 (noting that the Georgia Supreme Court held that Grace violated Carr’s 
Fourth Amendment rights and likely committed prosecutorial misconduct warranting a 
reversal of the conviction).  
 94  See id. at 519 (noting that Carr retained leading defense attorney Jack Martin, who 
hired I.J. Kranats and Ralph Newell, two of the preeminent fire experts in the country). 
Indeed, Carr had the further resources to fund his attorney’s consultation with experienced fire 
litigator Michael McKenzie (to whom the authors owe their own education in fire science) and 
McKenzie’s retention of John Lentini. Id. This sort of dream team is hardly one that the 
average criminal defendant can hope for, and yet, even with it, Carr’s freedom was nearly lost, 
and retained only after an epic struggle through the Georgia courts spanning many years. See 
id. at 518-33. 
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the fullest extent possible, questioning assumptions about canine evidence that had 
not been questioned seriously before.95 
In so doing, Carr’s legal team brought about a whole other revolution in fire 
science, parallel to the one embodied by the 1992 release of NFPA 921. At Carr’s 
April-May 1994 trial, “the judge ruled that [Lentini] was not qualified to testify 
about the accelerant detection canines because [he] was not an accelerant detection 
canine handler. The evidence of the 12 [unconfirmed canine] alerts was put before 
the jury.”96 After Carr’s conviction at trial, Lentini worked to convince the 
International Association of Arson Investigators (“IAAI”) to officially denounce the 
validity and use of unconfirmed canine alerts, which the IAAI did in a late-1994 
position paper.97 An important first step toward full shift in scientific consensus, the 
IAAI’s position paper was prelude to the NFPA 921 Technical Committee’s own 
first official comment on the use of unconfirmed canine alerts.98 Although,  
[t]he 1995 edition of NFPA 921 was already put to bed, . . . the 
Committee members felt that if they were to wait until 1998 to publish 
guidance on the proper use of accelerant detection canines, the case law 
that accumulated in the interim would render the Committee’s guidance 
ineffective.99  
A decision was thus made to issue an interim amendment to NFPA 921.100 
C. Changing of the Science 
That tentative interim amendment (“TIA”) was released on October 21, 1996—a 
mere two weeks before the trial of Andrew Babick in Battle Creek, Michigan. The 
TIA stated: “In order for the presence or absence of an ignitable liquid to be 
scientifically confirmed in a sample, that sample should be analyzed by a laboratory . 
. . . Any canine alert not confirmed by laboratory analysis should not be considered 
validated.”101 The NFPA’s response was owed to newly emerging research that 
indicated that while dogs undoubtedly have sensitive noses, it is impossible for them 
                                                           
 95  See id. at 520, 523, 526, 529. 
 96  Id. at 521. 
 97  Id. at 523.  
 98  Id. at 526. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id. To complete the story of Weldon Wayne Carr, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed 
his conviction on March 10, 1997, citing, among other things, to the impropriety of admitting 
unconfirmed canine alerts. Carr v. State, 482 S.E.2d 314, 317-18 (Ga. 1997). Although the 
State expressed an intention to retry him, more than six years passed without the case being 
brought back to trial, and eventually, the case against Carr was dismissed by the court on May 
19, 2003. State v. Carr, 598 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. 2004). Carr was officially exonerated in June of 
2004, more than ten years after his initial conviction at trial. See Weldon Wayne Carr, NAT’L 
REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (July 3, 2012), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/ 
Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3936.  
 101  Affidavit of Craig Balliet at ¶¶ 15-16, People v. Babick, No. 96-2562FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. 
Jan. 7, 2014) (quoting Tentative Interim Amendment to 1995 Edition of NFPA 921) (on file 
with authors). 
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to convey to their handlers exactly what substance they are alerting to.102 Given that 
fire scenes are a great source of hydrocarbons even outside of poured accelerants—
due to the burning/melting of plastics, vinyls, and other synthetics—canine alerts 
cannot alone account for the conclusion that gasoline is present at a fire scene.103  
Around 1996, following the lead of the IAAI and the NFPA, the rest of the 
relevant scientific community came around on this point. The 1996 edition of Kirk’s 
Fire Investigation (released in November 1996, almost simultaneous to Babick’s 
trial) reversed course from its prior edition word-for-word. The 1991 edition of 
Kirk’s, partaking in the traditional leap to attribute mystical qualities to canines, had 
advised: “Dogs [are] trained to detect one drop of gasoline or kerosene . . . . As with 
drug-detection dogs, their positive signals can be used as probable cause for searches 
and recovery or even accepted as proof of the presence of accelerants.”104 By 1996, 
the IAAI and NFPA’s positions had changed the paradigm. Indeed, following up on 
a 1994 position paper, the IAAI again denounced the use of canine alerts that fail 
confirmation by lab testing in July 1995—this time for a wider scientific audience—
in a lengthy letter published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences.105 One of the 
principal signers of that letter was John DeHaan, then a co-chair of the IAAI 
Forensic Science Committee.106 Unsurprisingly then, given that DeHaan is also the 
credited author of Kirk’s Fire Investigation, the next edition of Kirk’s (released in 
November 1996), reversed course entirely: 
As with drug-detection dogs, [accelerant-detection canine] alerts can be 
used as probable cause to search a person or take a sample from a fire 
scene, but their positive indications should not be accepted as proof of the 
presence of accelerants. Dogs cannot discriminate between gasoline used 
as an accelerant and volatile traces of carpet adhesives or insecticide 
sprays.107  
                                                           
 102  Id. at ¶ 16 (“The canine olfactory system is believed capable of detecting gasoline at 
concentrations below those normally cited for laboratory methods. The detection limit, 
however, is not the sole criterion, or even the most important criterion for any forensic 
technique. Specificity, the ability to distinguish between ignitable liquids and background 
materials, is even more important than sensitivity for detection of any ignitable liquid residues 
. . . . Current research does not indicate which individual chemical compounds contained in 
ignitable liquids may be produced from the burning of common synthetic materials.”). 
 103  Affidavit of David M. Smith, supra note 82, at ¶ 65 (emphasis added). 
 104  DEHAAN, supra note 89, at 135 (emphasis added). 
 105  See IAAI Forensic Science Committee, Letters to the Editor, IAAI Forensic Sciences 
Committee Position on the Use of Accelerant Detection Canines, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 532, 
532-34 (1995) (“Extremely low levels of such ignitable liquid vapors are normal to our 
environment. A canine is not capable of discriminating between these intrinsic vapors and 
deliberately added ignitable liquid vapors . . . . Any [canine] alert or indication not confirmed 
by laboratory analysis must be considered a false positive or unconfirmed indication . . . . If 
the forensic laboratory examination of the sample is negative for the presence of identifiable 
ignitable liquids, any positive indication by the canine for that sample must be deemed as not 
relevant.); see also LENTINI, SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOLS, supra note 51, at 523 (discussing the 
1994 position paper by IAAI upon which the 1995 letter was based). 
 106  See IAAI Forensic Science Committee, supra note 105. 
 107  JOHN D. DEHAAN, KIRK’S FIRE INVESTIGATION 178 (4th ed. 1997) (emphasis added). 
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D. Courts, Percolation and Holdouts 
As the leading scientific groups began to recognize the shift in science 
concerning canine alerts, courts slowly started to take notice as well. Although 
courts had routinely held unconfirmed canine alerts admissible as substantive 
evidence of the presence of accelerants even as late as 1993 and 1994,108 the 
scientific shift began its initial permeation by 1995.  
Perhaps the first major case to recognize the inklings of a scientific shift was the 
Illinois case of People v. Acri.109 In hindsight, Acri, which was decided in January of 
1996, is hardly groundbreaking. The court took no sides at all, and instead simply 
declined to have the disagreement in the relevant scientific community regarding 
uncorroborated alerts aired out in the courtroom, erring on the safe side of keeping 
the evidence out.110 The disagreement at that time, as Acri noted, was between “[o]ne 
faction, led by the IAAI,” which is comprised of “chemists and other professionals 
who are not dog handlers,” and “[o]thers, composed mainly of dog handlers and led 
by the [Canine Accelerant Detection Association (“CADA”)].111 CADA’s position 
was especially significant, given that it was a professional organization in the 
relevant field that gave individual canine handlers an ostensibly credible path to 
ignoring the IAAI and NFPA’s burgeoning opposition to the use of unconfirmed 
canine alerts.112 
Not long after Acri, however, came the Georgia Supreme Court’s definitive 
opinion in State v. Carr. Decided in March of 1997 (less than three months after 
Babick was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole), Carr 
constituted a braver, wholesale engagement with the then-thorny issue of 
unconfirmed canine alerts.113 And, even in hindsight, Carr was a groundbreaking 
opinion. Its holding on the relevant issue is worth repeating because it remains 
essentially the scientifically accepted position today: 
While the use of trained dogs can be a valuable part of investigative 
procedures and can provide important elements of probable cause to 
search, dog alerts to accelerants have not been shown, neither at the trial 
of this case nor in any Georgia appellate decision, to have the scientific 
                                                           
 108  See, e.g., State v. Buller, 517 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 1994) (holding that a canine’s 
seventy-five percent laboratory confirmation rate was accurate enough to admit an 
unconfirmed alert); see also Reisch v. State, No. 426, 1992, 1993 WL 227264, at *2 (Del. 
1993) (holding canine alerts were admissible without laboratory confirmation); State v. 
Acevedo, No. A189691T4, at *9-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 18, 1994) (holding that the 
canine handler’s testimony of his dog’s accuracy was generally accepted by the profession). 
We thank our former student Emma Lawton for providing the research that informs this 
footnote, and large parts of the text in this section. 
 109  662 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
 110  Id. at 117 (noting disagreement in relevant scientific community about the acceptability 
of unconfirmed canine alerts, and barring courtroom use of unconfirmed alerts solely because 
of that disagreement). 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. at 116 (canine handler noting that he disagrees with the IAAI’s position on 
unconfirmed alerts because CADA, “of which he is a member,” disagrees with IAAI). 
 113  Carr v. State, 482 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. 1997). 
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reliability necessary to permit their use as substantive evidence of the 
presence of accelerants. The trial court's ruling to the contrary was 
error.114  
Therefore, courts started to come around merely weeks after Babick’s conviction 
and sentencing. Unfortunately, the wisdom of Carr and even the hapless accuracy of 
Acri were rare exceptions in those days. And, as in the matter of the physical 
markers of arson, plenty of holdouts remained in the canine handler profession, and 
they sought admission of egregious, unverifiable canine alerts even years after 
Carr.115 
Perhaps the most famous case involving junk canine evidence that arose during 
this period of percolation is the 2006 federal prosecution of a Massachusetts man 
named James Hebshie. Ten years after the NFPA’s and Kirk’s Fire Investigation’s 
recognition of the problems surrounding canine evidence, United States v. Hebshie 
resulted in a significant habeas opinion repudiating canine evidence.116 In that case, 
canine handler Douglas Lynch presented alerts given by his dog, Billy, though they 
were not properly confirmed or contextualized for the jury.117 As federal judge 
Nancy Gertner described in granting Hebshie’s petition for writ of habeas corpus,  
It is not an understatement to say that Lynch, the dog handler, was 
permitted to testify to an almost mystical account of Billy's powers and 
her unique olfactory capabilities. He presented unsubstantiated claims 
about the dog's accuracy. He was allowed to go on at great length about 
his emotional relationship with the dog and his entirely subjective ability 
to interpret her face, what she thought, intended, and the “strength” of the 
alert she gave in this case. Finally, Lynch was permitted to testify that the 
dog did not alert to anything else on the premises, as if the dog had been 
allowed to range widely on the fire scene (she was not), and as if the dog's 
failure to alert had evidential value (it does not).118 
Moreover, the court found that proper investigation by trial counsel would have 
revealed the problems with the dog testimony and, more likely than not, trial counsel 
could have succeeded in having the canine evidence suppressed.119 And had such 
                                                           
 114  Id. at 318 (internal citations omitted). 
 115  One especially appalling example is Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Arkansas, 
Inc. v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512 (Ark. 2000), where a canine handler sought to testify that “a 
dog’s nose can detect 300 parts per billion, while the laboratory tests detect 100 parts per 
million.” Id. at 519.  
 116  United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 91-95 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 117  Id. at 93 (noting that the building that burned was a convenience store, and it would 
have logically contained several “light petroleum distillates,” yet further testing was not 
conducted to discover the source or probativeness of the canine’s alerts, and no explanation 
was given to the jury about the likelihood that any alerts by the canine could have been owed 
to innocent sources).  
 118  Id. at 93-94. 
 119  Id. at 93 (“The most significant problems should have been abundantly clear” to trial 
counsel, and had counsel properly objected and challenged the proffered testimony, exclusion, 
or at least strict limitation, “was more than a ‘reasonable probability.’ It was likely.”). 
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evidence been suppressed, a different outcome would have been likely at trial.120 
Implicitly, then, Hebshie is significant because it marks an era where not only have 
unconfirmed canine alerts been repudiated, but also, that repudiation has sunk in 
enough that a reasonable defense attorney is expected to be aware of it in order to 
meet the Strickland standard of providing constitutionally sufficient assistance of 
counsel to a defendant.121  
In the world of fire science, the prevailing fact of life is that holdouts die out: 
Wrongful convictions based on previously repudiated science become less likely as 
the years go by. Such has been the case in the realm of canine accelerant alerts, 
though the percolation has taken an alarmingly long time in some places.122 It is for 
that reason that the 2012 declaration by CADA, perhaps the last of the official 
organizational holdouts, is so significant. Although CADA had previously butted 
heads with the IAAI to argue that unconfirmed canine alerts could be used as 
affirmative evidence of accelerants being present,123 CADA reversed course entirely 
in 2012. In no uncertain terms, it proclaimed:  
The Canine Accelerant Detection Association (CADA) does not 
support, nor do we recommend, Accelerant Detection Canine Handlers 
testifying in criminal or civil court to the presence of an ignitable liquid 
without having received confirmation through laboratory analysis. . . . 
[N]o Prosecutor, Attorney or ADC Handler should ever testify or 
encourage testimony that an ignitable liquid is present without 
confirmation through laboratory analysis.124 
CADA’s declaration was, one would hope, the closing of the book on unconfirmed 
canine alerts. The process of percolation is thus finally complete—nearly twenty 
years after it began.  
III. COMPARATIVE BULLET LEAD ANALYSIS 
As the old maxim goes, if something seems too good to be true, it probably is. 
That simple common sense rule applies perfectly to the phenomenon of Comparative 
Bullet Lead Analysis (“CBLA”).125  
                                                           
 120  Id. at 127 (“Indeed, to say that the exclusion of either the accelerant laboratory analysis 
or the canine evidence would have undermined this verdict and grievously 
prejudiced Hebshie, is an understatement. There would have been no case at all.”). 
 121  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (holding that “[w]hen a 
convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant 
must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”). 
 122  See, e.g., People v. Jackson, No. 272776, 2008 WL 2037805, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 
May 13, 2008) (holding that canine alert is admissible as substantive evidence even in the 
absence of laboratory confirmation).  
 123  See, e.g., People v. Acri, 662 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (noting CADA’s 
disagreement with the IAAI). 
 124  CADA’s Position on “Testifying to Negative Samples,” CANINE ACCELERANT 
DETECTION ASS’N (Sept. 2012), http://cadafiredogs.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ 
CADAS-Position-on-Testifying-to-Negative-Samples.pdf.  
 125  This technique is alternatively known as Compositional Analysis of Bullet Lead or 
CABL. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD 
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A. The CBLA Proposition  
On an annual basis there are a staggering number of criminal offenses 
committed involving firearms. Of those, murder is probably the most 
heinous, and in the United States most murders are committed with 
firearms. Consequently, there is a social imperative in the United States to 
efficiently investigate and effectively prosecute offenses in which 
firearms are used, particularly homicides.126 
For a significant time period, starting in about the 1960s, and continuing into the 
2000s,127 law enforcement had in its arsenal a unique technology to aid in meeting 
the “social imperative” of investigating and prosecuting crimes of gun violence: 
CBLA.  
The theoretical underpinning of CBLA has to do with the process of bullet 
making, the metals used in that process, and the source of those metals.128 Very 
roughly speaking, bullets are made from melted scraps of lead, and each batch of 
melted lead (consisting primarily of used automotive batteries129) contains trace 
amounts of other elements, including arsenic, antimony, tin, cadmium, bismuth, 
copper, and silver.130 The premise of CBLA analysis is that the exact percentages of 
these trace metals in each batch of bullet lead are unique, and therefore, to a 
significant extent, it will be possible to trace the source of the bullet in question and 
put that information to probative use in a criminal case.131 “Many times the [expert] 
witnesses have even concluded that the [crime scene] bullets came from the same 
box of bullets” found at the suspect’s house.132 
CBLA analysis has three phases, succinctly described in an article by William 
Tobin, a former FBI metallurgist and the man most responsible for subjecting the 
CBLA technique to close scientific scrutiny in the late 1990s133— scrutiny that 
CBLA ultimately could not survive: 
                                                           
EVIDENCE 1 (2004) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].  
 126  Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis 
(CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43, 43 (2003) 
(citations omitted).  
 127  William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis: A Case Study in Flawed 
Forensics, CHAMPION, July 28, 2004, at 15-17.  
 128  See Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 126, at 46. 
 129  Id. at 46.  
 130  Paul C. Giannelli, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis: A Retrospective, 47 CRIM. LAW 
BULL. 306 (2011). 
 131  Id. 
 132  Tobin, supra note 127, at 13.  
 133  See, e.g., Steve Kroft, Evidence of Injustice: FBI’s Bullet Lead Analysis Used Flawed 
Science to Convict Hundreds of Defendants, 60 MINUTES (Nov. 16, 2007) at 3:02-3:28, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/evidence-of-injustice (noting that the CBLA paradigm “went 
unchallenged for 40 years, until Tobin retired in 1998 and decided to do his own study—
discovering that the basic premise had never actually been scientifically tested”).  
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1. Analytical Phase, where the elemental composition of bullets is 
ascertained through lab testing, a process that for many years required a 
nuclear reactor, but since 1995 has been accomplished through another, 
more readily duplicable technique. 
2. Grouping Phase, where “the elemental composition numbers 
generated during the [first phase] are ‘grouped’ according to similarity of 
compositional presence (amount). Compositions similar to a crime scene 
bullet(s) are put in one group and considered “analytically 
indistinguishable”; compositions considered dissimilar are placed in 
different groups and considered “analytically distinguishable.” 
3. Inference Phase, where an expert judges the “alleged probative 
significance of finding ‘analytically indistinguishable’ (similar) 
compositions in both crime scene and ‘known’ bullet samples.”134 
B. Shifts in the Science Underlying the CBLA Proposition 
As scientists reviewing the technique in recent years have concluded, potential 
problems arise at each phase of the CBLA proposition. 
1. Problems at Phase One 
Even in phase one, which critics of CBLA regard as the most scientifically 
credible phase,135 there is the issue of replicability and verifiability. While the 
scientific method requires that findings be verifiable and results be replicable,136 for 
more than twenty-five years such double-checking of phase one of the CBLA 
proposition could only be done by those with access to a nuclear reactor.137 While 
the shift to a more modern and accurate technique that does not require a nuclear 
reactor138 began to address this basic problem of scientific credibility, “[t]here are 
practical constraints . . . .”139 
Cadmium is almost always absent . . . . Similarly, tin is not present in a 
significant proportion of samples analyzed. “Bismuth is almost always in 
a very narrow range of compositions . . . . Silver is almost always in a 
very narrow range between 20 and 30 ppm.” When the analyst encounters 
these problems with respect to those four elements in the testing of a 
                                                           
 134  Tobin, supra note 127, at 13.  
 135  Id. (“In our challenge to CBLA practice, we generally assume the competent conduct of 
the first phase of the examinations (analytical chemistry).”). 
 136  Bob Grant, Science’s Reproducibility Problem, SCIENTIST (Dec. 18, 2012), 
http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/33719/title/Science-s-Reproducibility-
Problem (“The gold standard for science is reproducibility. Ideally, research results are only 
worthy of attention, publication, and citation if independent researchers can replicate them 
using a particular study’s methods and materials.”); see also NRC REPORT, supra note 125, at 
9 (noting that some of the published data pertaining to CBLA “lack specified assessments of 
reproducibility and repeatability”). 
 137  Tobin, supra note 127, at 13. 
 138  Id.; see also Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 126, at 48. 
 139  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 126, at 49. 
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given sample, in effect the analyst is forced to rely on three elements to 
characterize the sample . . . .140 
Such reliance on percentages of only antimony, arsenic, and tin increases the 
potential for mis-analysis at this first stage of CBLA.141 
2. Problems at Phase Two  
In the second phase, where “the expert attempts to group the measurements of 
the individual samples to determine whether the compositions of the two samples 
‘match’ or are ‘analytically indistinguishable,’”142 the potential for error and 
misdiagnosis is greater.143 While some courts applying Daubert previously failed to 
even reach this issue, holding that the scientific acceptability of the underlying 
technique was enough to satisfy Daubert,144 the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in what 
is perhaps the definitive court opinion on the shift in CBLA science,145 concluded 
that courts must proceed to evaluating the second (and third) phases of the CBLA 
hypothesis.146 The court based its reasoning on the holdings of Daubert and its direct 
progeny, which note that the inferences that an expert makes may be flawed, even if 
the underlying methodology is above board.147  
The basic goal of the second stage is to determine whether or not two bullets 
(presumably one from the crime scene and one found in the suspect’s possession) are 
“analytically indistinguishable” in terms of their metallic compositions.148 A 
significant problem arises: 
Anyone familiar with the limitations of the ability of even precise 
instruments to make measurements realizes that when an expert uses the 
expression, “analytically indistinguishable,” the expert is not saying that 
there is a perfect match in elemental composition. Rather, he or she is 
                                                           
 140  Id. (quoting William A. Tobin & Wayne Duerfeldt, How Probative Is Comparative 
Bullet Lead Analysis?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 26, 33 (2002)).  
 141  Id. at 48-49 (noting that Gulf General Atomic, which pioneered the used of CBLA 
under a contract with the United States Atomic Energy Commission, deemed reliance solely 
on points of similarity in percentages of these three elements to be “inadequate”); see also 
NRC REPORT, supra note 125, at 20 (noting that not all of the seven elements used by the FBI 
in its CBLA process are have significant “discriminating capabilities,” and, in particular, tin 
and cadmium are nearly useless). 
 142  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 126, at 50. 
 143  Id. 
 144  E.g., Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. 2006) (discussing lower 
court opinion). 
 145  For example, in the textbook Wrongful Convictions: Cases and Materials, Ragland is 
the second case included in the chapter on “Evidentiary Standards and Science,” preceded 
only by Daubert itself. See JUSTIN BROOKS, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
304 (2011). 
 146  Ragland, 191 S.W.3d at 577-78. 
 147  Id. at 578 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)). 
 148  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 126, at 49. 
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asserting that although there are differences, the differences detected fall 
within the precision limits of the particular measuring technique.149 
While the mathematical route to a finding of “analytically indistinguishable” may 
be above reproach, the data being put in to the equation is flawed.150 The first reason 
is the impreciseness of measurement noted by Imwinkelried and Tobin.151 Beyond 
just that, however, elemental composition could vary in different parts of the same 
bullet.152 Nevertheless, in CBLA analysis, the analyst simply takes three samples at 
random from the bullet, making no confirmation that what he obtained was in fact a 
sample representative of the metallic composition of the whole bullet.153  
3. Problems at Phase Three 
Despite those shortcomings of the first and second stages of inference, however, 
critics of CBLA take much more issue with the “unjustifiable extrapolation” that 
characterizes the third phase:154  
It is the third phase of the practice, the inference phase, that is most 
objectionable and, unfortunately, the most directly incriminating. In this 
phase, the expert witness has most frequently concluded that, because the 
crime scene and known bullets are allegedly “analytically 
indistinguishable” (compositionally similar), the bullets have a common 
origin as to “molten source.” In the courtroom, the expert witness states 
that the compared bullets “were made by the same manufacturer, on the 
same day, from the same molten source of lead,” and often that the bullets 
“originated from the same box of bullets.”. . . The witnesses have asserted 
as universal assumptions that all bullets from the same molten source 
have the same composition, and that all bullets from different molten 
sources have different compositions.155 
The assumptions required to make the extrapolation in question were never seriously 
tested prior to 2000, and once they were tested, they proved to be quite 
questionable.156  
                                                           
 149  Id. 
 150  Id. 
 151  Id. 
 152  NRC REPORT, supra note 125, at 29, 30 (noting that measurements of elemental 
composition of a bullet “could have differed . . . had we used different fragments of the same 
bullet for measurement of the overall average, since even an individual bullet may not be 
completely homogenous in its composition . . . .”). 
 153  Tobin, supra note 127, at 13; see also NRC REPORT, supra note 125, at 1 (noting three 
samples are taken from each bullet); id. at 30 (noting that taking three different samples from 
the same bullet could yield different compositional readings because “even an individual 
bullet may not be completely homogenous in its composition”). 
 154  See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 127, at 14. 
 155  Id. at 13. 
 156  Id. (noting “there have never been any comprehensive and meaningful studies of the 
hypotheses and assumptions of CBLA”); see also Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 
569, 578-79 (Ky. 2006). 
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For example, it was assumed that “the source from which the fragment or sample 
originated is compositionally uniform or homogeneous.”157 In other words, it was 
assumed that each batch of molten lead, which is in the range of 100-125 tons and 
could yield as many as 54 million bullets, was itself homogenous in its elemental 
makeup.158 That assumption, it turns out, could not survive a real world analysis. As 
the 2004 National Research Council Report on CBLA noted, homogeneity should 
not be assumed, and really, the evidence seems to prove a lack of it.159 
Second, even assuming compositional uniformity, for that compositional 
uniformity to have any meaning, another assumption is needed: “[T]hat the 
composition of each molten source is unique or individual.”160 If multiple batches 
could have identical composition, then it would not be possible to narrow down the 
source of a particular bullet to a particular batch of melted lead. For this reason 
“[CBLA] also assumes that each lead source has a unique composition. [However,] 
[p]ublished data have shown that two lead sources prepared twelve years apart had 
compositions that were analytically indistinguishable.”161 
C. Implications of the Problems with the CBLA Proposition 
The lack of validity in both assumptions that are central to phase three CBLA 
analysis (not to mention the additional problems that arise at phases one and two) 
means that the testimony often given in court cases by supposed experts in CBLA 
lacks credibility, and may have led to many manifest injustices.162 For example, 
experts have often testified that a compositional match means the bullets came from 
the same box of ammunition.163 Such testimony is powerful and convenient, and it 
led in part to the capital conviction and subsequent execution in Texas of James 
Earhart.164  
                                                           
 157  Tobin, supra note 127, at 13. 
 158  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 126, at 67. 
 159  NRC REPORT, supra note 125, at 79 (“It is generally assumed that the composition of a 
given melt is constant and homogeneous from the beginning to the end of the pour if nothing 
is added to the pot during the pour . . . . It should be noted that during a pour material may be 
added to the original melt, thus producing time-varying compositional changes . . . . In the 
case of at least one manufacturer, billets are not poured from a vat that has a constant 
composition; instead, while the vat is being poured, molten lead from another pot is 
continuously added to maintain the level of molten lead in the vat being poured. Thus, 
compositional changes can occur during casting . . . . [Research] also showed occasional 
distinct concentration changes in some elements as samples were extracted from the 
beginning, middle, and end of the pour.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 160  Tobin, supra note 127, at 16. 
 161  NRC REPORT, supra note 125, at 9 (internal citation omitted). 
 162  See, e.g., Kroft supra note 133. 
 163  See Gianelli, supra note 130, at 310 (quoting expert John Riley’s trial testimony in 
State v. Earhart, where Riley said “from my 21 years experience of doing bullet lead analysis 
and doing research on boxes of ammunition down though the years I can determine if bullets 
came from the same box of ammunition”); see also NRC REPORT, supra note 125, at 91-92 
(citing several cases where experts have testified that compositionally indistinguishable 
bullets, in turn, could/would/probably did come from the same box of ammunition).  
 164  Gianelli, supra note 130 (citing Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 
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However, in light of the comprehensive analysis of the 2004 NRC Report, and 
even the pre-2004 publications from experts and scholars such as Tobin, there is 
simply no basis to draw such conclusions. Given that millions of bullets come from 
each batch of melted lead, it is senseless to attempt to trace any two given bullets 
back to the same box. Even if it is assumed that each batch of lead is internally 
homogenous as well as compositionally unique from every other batch (and both of 
these assumptions have been debunked, as noted above), each box of bullets contains 
twenty bullets,165 whereas a single lead melt can produce up to 54 million bullets.166 
These millions of bullets made from a single pour would, under the CBLA 
hypothesis, all be compositionally indistinguishable—hardly traceable to the same 
box.  
An additional problem arises from the “clustering” of bullets from the same 
batch, which tend to go to the same geographic area.167 Not only can analytically 
indistinguishable bullets not be traced to the same box, but also, it is likely that 
similar branded and caliber bullets sold during a given time in a given geographic 
region are analytically indistinguishable. Thus, any box of similar ammunition in the 
given region where the crime occurred is disproportionately more likely to contain 
bullets that are analytically indistinguishable from the bullets used in a crime in that 
local area.168  
All in all, the potential for wrongful arrest and prosecution of innocent 
individuals is quite high, if law enforcement officials take the CBLA hypotheses on 
their face, and without regard to the bounty of research from the past ten to fifteen 
years indicating that CBLA is a technique too flawed to be considered science at all.  
D. Percolation Delays and the Prolonged Death of CBLA 
The validity of the CBLA proposition, accepted since the 1960s, was only rarely 
questioned before 2002. One such rare occasion was in 1991, when, “at the 
International Symposium on the Forensic Aspects of Trace Evidence, hosted by the 
FBI, various experts in the field ‘cautioned that the variability (of the elemental mix) 
within a production run . . . has not been addressed in a comprehensive study.’”169 
However, the 1991 study was essentially ignored, as CBLA continued to be 
conducted by the FBI and used in courts against defendants throughout the 1990s 
and into the 2000s.170 
                                                           
1991); and Searchable Database of Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions (search for “Earhart” under “Execution 
Database”)). 
 165  Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Ky. 2006).  
 166  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 126, at 67. 
 167  Id. at 47. 
 168  NRC REPORT, supra note 125, at 9 (“Although the major bullet manufacturers 
distribute their products nationally and even internationally, some regional distributors might 
receive and distribute many bullets from the same compositionally indistinguishable source. 
That would increase the probability of finding a match between a crime-scene bullet and a 
bullet in the possession of an innocent person.”). 
 169  Clemons v. State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Md. 2006) (quoting Imwinkelried & Tobin, 
supra note 126, at 50)). 
 170  Gianelli, supra note 130, at 307 (noting “[t]he technique was not seriously challenged 
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The 1991 study was an immense opportunity lost. While those within the 
relevant scientific community should have been put on notice about the unreliability 
of CBLA analysis, and pushed to examine its underlying paradigm, such progress 
would have to wait a few more years. In the meantime arose cases like that of James 
Earhart.171  
Convicted in 1988 of capital murder in Texas, Earhart filed a habeas corpus 
petition in 1995.172 In that habeas petition, he sought to question the validity of the 
CBLA evidence used against him through the procedural hook of a Sixth 
Amendment claim (arguing “trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing 
to request an expert regarding analysis of bullet evidence”).173 The State’s case 
against Earhart was entirely circumstantial, and CBLA evidence played a strong part 
in it.174 Indeed the prosecution’s expert at the 1988 trial spoke of CBLA in as 
egregious a manner as imaginable, indicating that the bullet recovered from the 
victim was “analytically indistinguishable” from those found in Earhart's possession, 
and that “analytically indistinguishable bullets are typically found within the same 
box of ammunition.”175 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed that the CBLA 
evidence was central to the prosecution’s case.176 In response to Earhart’s claim that 
trial counsel performed ineffectively in failing to obtain his own expert to challenge 
the CBLA evidence, the court went so far as to say “Texas law supports Earhart’s 
argument.”177 However, given that the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel 
has two parts, deficient performance by the attorney and requisite prejudice caused 
to the defendant,178 Earhart’s claim failed.179 Even though trial counsel’s failure to 
obtain an expert may have been a bad choice (given the centrality of the CBLA 
evidence to the State’s case), the court held that it would not have made any 
difference, because there was no expert available to testify to prejudice anyway.180 
Speaking haplessly to the very core of shifted science’s percolation problem, the 
Fifth Circuit wrote: 
Earhart has not identified an expert witness available to testify on his 
behalf or the type of testimony such a witness would have provided 
                                                           
until a retired FBI examiner, William Tobin, began questioning the procedure in scientific and 
legal journals and in court testimony as well” and citing to Tobin’s articles from 2002 and 
2003, and courtroom testimony from 2005 and 2006). 
 171  Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 172  Id. at 1064-65. 
 173  Id. at 1065. 
 174  Id. at 1067 (noting “the significant role the bullet evidence played in the prosecution's 
case”). 
 175  Id. at 1064. 
 176  Id. at 1067. 
 177  Id.  
 178  See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984). 
 179  Earhart, 132 F.3d at 1067. 
 180  Id. at 1068. 
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beyond that elicited at trial. . . . In short, assuming defense counsel was 
deficient in failing to request an expert, Earhart has not established that 
this failure prejudiced his defense or otherwise rendered the outcome of 
his trial unreliable.181 
Simply put, Earhart had a point, but the science just was not there yet, so Earhart was 
out of luck. He was executed on August 11, 1999.182  
The tide started to turn in earnest on CBLA in 2002.183 Two studies co-authored 
by Tobin that year,184 helped bring the questions surrounding CBLA far enough into 
the light to actually compel the FBI to act. Due in large part to Tobin’s advocacy, the 
“FBI asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review the technique. NAS 
appointed a committee of scientists, statisticians, and attorneys to conduct the 
review.”185 Even as the NAS committee was appointed and its work began, 
convictions continued on the basis of CBLA. The most important of these, as will be 
discussed later, was the March 2002 murder conviction of Shane Ragland in 
Kentucky.186  
The result of the NAS Committee’s work came out in 2004, in the form of a 214-
page report entitled “Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence.”187 That 
document contained conclusions that “undercut” the very premises that CBLA was 
built on.188 The report addressed in detail the many potential problems at each 
analytical step of the CBLA calculus.189 
The NAS report should have been the death knell to CBLA. The report had been 
commissioned by the FBI—one of only two agencies in America that were 
performing comparative bullet lead analysis—and its conclusions amounted 
essentially to: “The very basic foundations of the CBLA hypothesis are flawed.” But 
the FBI was not ready to give in. Even as the NAS Committee proceeded about its 
work preparing the report, the FBI obstructed the process,190 foreshadowing what 
would happen once the report was released: “The FBI's response to the NAS Report 
                                                           
 181  Id.  
 182  See James Earhart, TEX. EXECUTION INFO. CTR, 
http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/184.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).  
 183  See Gianelli, supra note 130, at 307 (noting that the CBLA “technique was not 
seriously challenged until a retired FBI examiner, William Tobin, began questioning the 
procedure in scientific and legal journals,” with citations indicating that Tobin’s publications 
started in 2002).  
 184  Id. at 306 n.3. 
 185  Id. at 307. 
 186  Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 578 (Ky. 2006).  
 187  NRC REPORT, supra note 125. 
 188  Gianelli, supra note 130, at 309. 
 189  NRC REPORT, supra note 125, at 109-13. 
 190  Gianelli, supra note 130, at 311-12 (citing “peculiarities,” incomplete data, and high 
error rates to conclude: “In short, the NAS Committee, appointed at the behest of and funded 
by the FBI, was not provided with critical data that would have assisted it in evaluating the 
technique.”). 
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was also disconcerting. The Bureau quickly put out a press release, obscuring the 
report's findings . . . . In effect, the FBI cherry-picked favorable statements from the 
report and downplayed the unfavorable crucial findings.”191 
While the FBI hemmed, hawed and held out, courts began to get the message: 
CBLA did not stand up to scientific scrutiny. In United States v Mikos,192 Judge 
Ronald Guzman of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois issued the first opinion applying the lessons of Tobin’s mounting offensive 
against CBLA.193 In Mikos, the court noted that the CBLA expert’s “ultimate 
conclusion is based upon a series of determinations that lack scientific accuracy.”194 
Noting both that “no one can say with any reasonable degree of scientific certainty 
what the probability or even the range of probabilities is” for a coincidental match of 
chemical compositions of bullets from different sources, and that “the record before 
us does not reflect that the samples were gathered in any approved scientific manner 
so as to be considered as representative of the bullet population as a whole,”195 the 
court essentially barred step three of the CBLA analysis. While the State’s expert 
would be allowed to say the crime scene bullets were analytically indistinguishable 
from bullets found in the suspect’s possession, he would not be permitted to 
haphazardly opine as to the significance of this fact, as countless experts previously 
had been.196  
Much like Acri in the realm of canine accelerant alerts, Mikos was an opinion 
that emerged on the cusp of a major scientific shift. While it came to the right 
conclusion, its analysis was not fully evolved. For that, our discussion shifts back to 
Shane Ragland, and the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 2006 opinion in his case.197 
Aided by the fact that in 2005 the FBI had finally abandoned its own use of CBLA, 
Ragland took the Mikos rationale further and to a proper conclusion: Not only could 
no one say how common coincidental matches could be, but this uncertainty was a 
systemic error fatal not only in a single case, but rather fatal to the very premise of 
CBLA as a forensic tool.198  
In what remains today the definitive opinion on the issue of the unreliability of 
CBLA, the Kentucky Supreme Court ended the era of uncertainty: CBLA no longer 
had a place in criminal convictions. Nearly a decade after Tobin first identified flaws 
in the very premise of CBLA,199 the shift in consensus was complete in the relevant 
scientific community, the legal community, and had even begun to spill into the 
awareness of the public at large by 2007.200 
                                                           
 191  Id. at 313 (internal citations omitted). 
 192  No. 02 CR 137, 2003 WL 22922197 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2003). 
 193  Gianelli, supra note 130, at 310 n.31 (indicating Mikos was first such opinion). 
 194  Mikos, 2003 WL 22922197, at *3. 
 195  Id. at *4. 
 196  Id. at *6. 
 197  Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2006). 
 198  Id. at 579-80. 
 199  See Kroft, supra note 133, at 3:02-3:28. 
 200  See, e.g., John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2007), 
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IV. SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME—SCIENCE STILL SHIFTING 
Like the other fields discussed above, the science surrounding so-called “Shaken 
Baby Syndrome” (SBS)—a medicolegal diagnosis of child abuse typically based on 
three specific symptoms—has developed, shifted, significantly in the last several 
decades. However, the SBS landscape makes a straightforward application of the 
concept of shifted science more difficult than the other fields described above.  
Unlike fire science or comparative bullet lead analysis—where nearly all of the 
relevant scientific community has denounced the old ways—the debate is far from 
over in the realm of SBS. Instead, scholars, scientists and practitioners across a wide 
continuum of the medical field continue to disagree about the viability of the SBS 
diagnosis, and its exact applications.201 Still, undeniable changes have occurred—
with some penetrating more deeply than others. One thing is certain: the SBS 
diagnosis has been the subject of increasingly intense scrutiny and the landscape 
looks much different than it did when the diagnosis first emerged. Thus, SBS lends 
itself as an interesting study of shifting science, where the historical percolation 
delays described above for other fields are actually still playing out.  
A. The Beginning—“Good Shakings” in Northern England 
In its purest form, the SBS Hypothesis202 posits that intentional child abuse in 
infants and young children, can be reliably diagnosed from a finding of three 
symptoms: (1) encephalopathy (brain injury—usually brain swelling); (2) subdural 
hematoma (bleeding on the surface of the brain) and; (3) retinal hemorrhage 
(bleeding behind the eyes).203 These three symptoms are often referred to as the 
diagnostic “triad.”204  
Dr. Norman Guthkelch is often credited as being the inventor of the SBS 
hypothesis.205 Working as a pediatric neurosurgeon working in northern England in 
the early 1970s, Dr. Guthkelch noticed a curious trend of injuries to children: “They 
had blood on the surface of the brain but no external signs of violence to the 
head.”206 He came to attribute such injuries to the local practice of giving a child “a 
good shaking” as a form of discipline, as opposed to hitting the child.207  
                                                           
 201  See, e.g., Debbie Cenziper, Shaken Science: A Disputed Diagnosis Imprisons Parents, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/shaken-
baby-syndrome/?wpisrc=al_alert.  
 202  SBS critics note that the word “hypothesis” is intentional and appropriate, noting the 
lack of testing necessary to call SBS a “theory” or really anything but a hypothesis: “It's 
actually just a hypothesis, and I use that word intentionally.” Keith Findley et al., Examining 
Shaken Baby Syndrome Convictions in Light of New Medical Scientific Research, 37 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 219, 222 (2012).  
 203  DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME” AND THE 
INERTIA OF JUSTICE 5 (2014).  
 204  Id.  
 205  Joseph Shapiro, Rethinking Shaken Baby Syndrome, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (June 29, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/06/29/137471992/rethinking-shaken-baby-syndrome.  
 206  Cenziper, supra note 201, at Part II, § 2. 
 207  Id. 
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In 1971, Guthkelch wrote a paper titled Infantile Subdural Hematoma and its 
Relationship to Whiplash Injuries where he proposed that shaking alone could cause 
a subdural hematoma in an infant, as the result of ruptured bridging veins that drain 
blood from the brain.208 The next year, pediatric radiologist John Caffey coined the 
term “whiplash shaken infant syndrome,” to describe injuries similar to those 
Guthkelch had observed in England.209 Caffey wrote that this method of abuse is 
“practiced in all levels of society, by a wide variety of persons, in a wide variety of 
ways, for a wide variety of motives.”210 Moreover, he wrote, “the infantile head is 
especially vulnerable to whiplash injuries owing to a combination of the normal 
relatively heavy head and weak neck muscles.”211  
Despite these landmark publications, Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer describes 
the late 1970s and 1980s as a “time of relative quiescence” for the SBS diagnosis: 
“While researchers continued to explore the subject, the impact of SBS outside the 
medical community was marginal . . . [and] the relationship between SBS and crime 
was slow to develop.”212 Indeed, the term “Shaken Baby Syndrome” did not come 
into general usage until the 1980s.213 
Moving slowly at first, diagnoses of SBS, and prosecutions based on it, began to 
rise steadily over the years. The first appeal of a conviction based on the SBS 
hypothesis came in 1984, and fewer than fifteen such appeals were reported in the 
next five years.214 However, that number would grow substantially in the years that 
                                                           
 208  A.N. Guthkelch, Infantile Subdural Haematoma and Its Relationship to Whiplash 
Injuries, BRITISH MED. J., May 1971, at 430; see also Carole Jenny, Foreword, ABUSIVE HEAD 
TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN xi (2007) (describing Guthlekch’s article as “the first clear 
reference in the world’s medical literature to shaking as a means of inducing head injury in 
infants and small children”).  
 209  Cenziper, supra note 201, at Part II, § 2. 
 210  John Caffey, On the Theory and Practice of Shaking Infants, 124 AM. J. DISEASES 
CHILD. 161, 168 (1972).  
 211  Id.  
 212  TUERKHEIMER, supra note 203, at 2.  
 213  LORI FRASIER ET AL., ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN 2 (2007).  
 214  TUERKHEIMER, supra note 203, at 2. The testimony of a coroner in a 1984 case, 
provides a classic example of the type of testimony given in SBS cases, particularly those 
from the early years:  
Q. Doctor, did you have an occasion to determine and qualify the type of force which 
you believe that would have had to have been used on that child in order to have it 
sustain the type of injuries which you viewed? 
A. I think on a baby there is no question that there is violent force. 
Q. Now, Doctor, did you also reach an opinion, based upon a reasonable medical 
certainty as to the cause of death of Patricia Schneider? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was that opinion, sir? 
A. Brain death. 
Q. And Doctor, was that as a result of the shaking? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. And your examination of the other organs of the child and your visual examination, 
was that child, Patricia Schneider, prior to December 12, 1983, otherwise a very 
healthy little baby? 
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followed, with more than 200 appellate decisions between 1990 and 2000, and more 
than 800 between 2000 and 2010.215 While recognizing that review of appellate 
decisions is not a perfect way to measure the number of prosecutions, Tuerkheimer 
notes that the data suggests “that the total volume of prosecutions has been on a 
sharply upward trajectory since 1990.”216 She estimates that currently, approximately 
200 defendants are being convicted based on the SBS hypothesis annually.217 The 
National Center on Shaken Baby Syndrome asserts that 1,300 children are diagnosed 
with SBS each year in the United States.218  
B. Challenges and Changes—Pathognomonic No More 
Challenges to the SBS hypothesis started to emerge in the late 1980s when 
researchers delved into the biomechanics underlying the hypothesis. In 1987, 
Duhaime et al. published a report of a study designed to test the hypothesis on a 
biomechanical level.219 The study concluded that, “the shaken baby syndrome, at 
least in its most severe acute form, is not usually caused by shaking alone. Although 
shaking may, in fact, be a part of the process, it is more likely that such infants suffer 
blunt impact.”220 Based on her findings from this and other biomechanical studies, 
Duhaime wrote that “‘Shaken Baby [S]yndrome’ is a misnomer, implying a 
mechanism of injury which does not account mechanically for the radiographic or 
pathological findings.”221 
Perhaps related to the development of evidence-based medicine in the late 
1990s,222 the late 1990s and early 2000s saw the onset of increased doubt and debate 
about the validity of SBS. In a 2003 study, Dr. Mark Donohoe noted: 
The issue of the evidence for SBS appears analogous to an inverted 
pyramid, with a small database (most of it poor-quality original research, 
retrospective in nature, and without appropriate control groups) spread to 
a broad body of somewhat divergent opinions. One may need reminding 
that repeated opinions based on poor-quality data cannot improve the 
                                                           
A. Absolutely. 
State v. Schneider, No. L-84-214, 1984 WL 3719, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1984). 
 215  TUERKHEIMER, supra note 201, at 2. 
 216  Id.  
 217  Id. at 10.  
 218  SBS Statistics, NAT’L CENTER ON SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME, 
http://dontshake.org/sbs.php?topNavID=3&subNavID=27 (last visited June 22, 2015).  
 219  Ann-Christine Duhaime et al., The Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Clinical, Pathological, 
and Biomechanical Study, 66 J. NEUROSURGERY 409 (1987).  
 220  Id. at 414.  
 221  Ann-Christine Duhaime et al., “Shaken Baby Syndrome:” A Misnomer?, 4 J. 
PEDIATRICS NEUROSCI. 77, 85 (1988).  
 222  Jeffrey A. Claridge & Timothy C. Fabian, History and Development of Evidence-Based 
Medicine, 29 WORLD J. SURGERY 547 (2005). 
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quality of evidence . . . . There exist major gaps in the medical literature 
about SBS.223  
Donohoe also noted the circular nature of much of the research: “Many of the 
authors repeated the logical flaw that if [retinal hemorrhages] and [subdural 
hematomas] are nearly always seen in SBS, the presence of [retinal hemorrhage] and 
[subdural hematoma] ‘prove’ that a baby was shaken intentionally.”224 This logical 
fallacy is tantamount to asserting “because most doctors are smart, most smart 
people are doctors.”225 Overall, Donohoe concluded that “the data available in the 
medical literature by the end of 1998 [was] inadequate to support any standard case 
definitions, or any standards for diagnostic assessment.”226 Even supporters of the 
SBS diagnosis admit there are problems with circularity in the relevant studies.227  
The basis of the scientific challenge to the SBS diagnosis is that symptoms 
traditionally relied on are not pathognomonic for abuse—meaning they can occur as 
the result of other natural or accidental causes.228 Even this point is not seriously 
contested today, as supporters of the diagnosis readily admit it: “[T]here is a clear, 
strong, and highly statistically significant association between SDHs [subdural 
hematomas] and RHs [retinal hemorrhages] with trauma. However, the mere 
presence along of SDHs and RHs does not establish a diagnosis of AHT [abusive 
head trauma].”229 
Others have questioned the significance of retinal hemorrhages to the SBS 
diagnosis, stating that the diagnostic relationship is “not supported by the objective 
scientific evidence . . . . Until good evidence is available, we urge caution in 
interpreting eye findings out of context.”230 Again, the supporters of SBS 
acknowledge that retinal hemorrhages can have a multitude of causes other than 
abuse, while maintaining there is a “significant statistical association of severe RHs 
and AHT.”231 
                                                           
 223  Mark Donohoe, Evidence-Based Medicine and Shaken Baby Syndrome, 24 AM. J. 
FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 239, 241 (2003). 
 224  Id. 
 225  See Keith A. Findley et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual 
Innocence: Getting It Right, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209, 287 (2012). 
 226  Donohoe, supra note 223, at 241. 
 227  See, e.g., Sandeep Narang, A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby 
Syndrome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 505, 562 (2011) (“[S]ome circularity is inevitable, 
because we are unwilling to experimentally shake infants, and even reliably confessed 
accounts have some doubt.”). 
 228  Id. at 562-63. 
 229  Id. at 571; see also Carole Jenny, Presentation, 2011 New York City Abusive Head 
Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome Training Conference: The Mechanics: Distinguishing 
AHT/SBS from Accidents and Other Medical Conditions, slide 33 (Sept. 23, 2011), 
www.queensda.org/SBSConference/SBC2011.html (“No trained pediatricians thinks that 
subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and encephalopathy equals abuse. The ‘triad’ is a 
myth!”). 
 230  Patrick Lantz et al., Perimacular Retinal Folds from Childhood Head Trauma, 328 
BMJ 754, 756 (2004). 
 231  Narang, supra note 227, at 558.  
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Other researchers have described witnessed falls that produced classic SBS 
findings, meaning “[a] history by the caretaker that the child may have fallen cannot 
be dismissed.”232 Supporters of the SBS hypothesis counter by citing research 
finding that the risk of death from a short fall is less than one in one million 
children.233  
The position papers of the American Academy of Pediatrics (“AAP”) frame the 
development nicely. In 2001, the AAP wrote that, “data regarding the nature and 
frequency of head trauma consistently support the need for a presumption of child 
abuse when a child younger than 1 year has an intracranial injury.”234 However, in 
2009 the AAP revised its position in accordance with the growing medical research. 
It acknowledged that “the mechanisms and resultant injuries of accidental and 
abusive head injury overlap” and that “there is no single or simple test to determine 
the accuracy of the diagnosis.”235 Moreover, the 2009 statement removed language 
advocating the “presumption of child abuse.”236  
In short, a substantial debate continues about the validity of SBS hypothesis, in 
light of new research and the repudiation of the idea that the triad is pathognomonic 
of abuse. While a new consensus has yet to be reached, this debate is itself 
significant.237 And though the debate rages on, it is key to note that the battle lines 
have changed. Indeed, even those in the relevant scientific community who still 
support the reliability of the SBS hypothesis have modified their positions in 
significant ways. For example, in 2009, the AAP also recommended a change in 
terminology, urging that: “Pediatricians should use the term ‘abusive head trauma’ 
rather than a term that implies a single injury mechanism, such as shaken baby 
syndrome, in their diagnosis and medical communications.”238 Thus, at the very 
least, supporters of SBS have conceded that the symptoms associated with SBS may 
not always (or ever) be caused by shaking alone.239  
                                                           
 232  John Plunkett, Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by Short-Distance Falls, 22 AM. J. 
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PEDIATRICS 1409, 1410 (2009). 
 236  Id. 
 237  See, e.g., State v. Edmunds, 746 N.W.2d 590, 599 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (“[I]t is the 
emergence of a legitimate and significant dispute within the medical community as to the 
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 238  Christian et al., supra note 235, at 1411. 
 239  Chris N. Morison & Robert A. Minns, The Biomechanics of Shaking, in SHAKING AND 
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C. The Existing Landscape—Percolation in Progress 
Unlike the old methodologies in the realm of fire science or comparative bullet 
lead analysis, one cannot make a blanket claim that SBS hypothesis has been wholly 
repudiated by the relevant community. Indeed, as addressed earlier, a fierce debate 
continues, with experts championing both sides.240 Nevertheless, it is undeniable that 
there has been a shift. Recent years have seen increased challenges to the validity of 
the SBS hypothesis,241 and even some supporters now acknowledge that the classic 
SBS symptoms can have non-abusive causes.242  
For his part, Norman Guthkelch, the British doctor who is considered the father 
of the SBS hypothesis, has his own concerns about the way in which the diagnosis 
has developed. In a 2011 interview with National Public Radio, Guthkelch, then 
ninety-five years old, expressed grave doubts over how far the SBS hypothesis had 
been carried by law enforcement: “I don't think that the famous triad, however well 
some people think it's defined, can ever be so well-defined that you can say that and 
nothing else cause it—that meaning shaking.”243  
Court opinions on the issue, for the most part, are split, as is to be expected for a 
science that is still shifting. Some, starting with the landmark Edmunds opinion in 
2008, have recognized the debate within the scientific community as reason enough 
to subject the SBS hypothesis to further scrutiny than it endured at trial, and have 
therefore granted new trials where the jury may be apprised of the controversy.244  
Indeed in 2014, federal district Judge Matthew Kennelly of the Northern District 
of Illinois went further than simply acknowledging a debate.245 He used perhaps the 
strongest language to date in granting habeas relief to Jennifer Del Prete, who had 
been convicted of first-degree murder in 2005 based on the SBS hypothesis.246 In a 
ninety-seven-page opinion, summarizing in depth the testimony from eleven forensic 
experts presented in the post-conviction stage of the case alone, Judge Kennelly 
considered, in light of “the new evidence together with the evidence presented at Del 
Prete's trial . . . whether any reasonable juror who heard all of it could find Del Prete 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”247 The judge concluded: “The answer to that 
question is a rather resounding no,”248 and went on to note that the SBS hypothesis is 
arguably “more an article of faith than a proposition of science.”249   
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Still, other courts continue to endorse the SBS hypothesis, particularly in 
deciding whether the underlying science is sufficiently reliable to be admissible 
under various standards.250 Thus, while a clear trend—starting with Edmunds in 
2008—has emerged in courts questioning Shaken Baby Syndrome/abusive head 
trauma in various ways, it has not been universal, and prosecutions based on the SBS 
hypothesis continue.251  
The United States Supreme Court briefly passed on the issue of the validity of 
the SBS hypothesis recently as well, in the case of Cavazos v. Smith.252 Shirley Ree 
Smith was convicted of killing her seven-week-old grandson in 1996 based on the 
SBS hypothesis.253 While it upheld the conviction because the specific claim being 
litigated did not allow consideration of new evidence,254 the majority wrote, 
“[d]oubts about whether Smith is in fact guilty are understandable.”255 Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent examined the considerable scientific evidence that has 
accumulated since Smith went to trial and concluded, “[w]hat is now known about 
SBS hypotheses seems to me worthy of considerable weight in the discretionary 
decision whether to take up this tragic case.”256 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is notable 
                                                           
 250  See, e.g., Flick v. Warren, 465 F. App’x 461, 465 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding defense 
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because it implies that doubts about the SBS hypothesis have reached the ears of our 
highest court, meaning further scrutiny of the traditional SBS prosecution is likely in 
the coming years. Few platforms can as swiftly spread the knowledge of a shift in 
science than an opinion emerging from the United States Supreme Court, even if it is 
a dissent.257 
As the debate continues, it has now transformed into one about where the line is 
to be drawn, as opposed to whether a line is to be drawn at all. That is a significant 
shift, and we anticipate further evolution in the SBS hypothesis in the years to come. 
As the shift transpires around us, and yet prosecutions of SBS cases continue, the 
percolation problem described historically in the realms of fire science and 
comparative bullet lead analysis is all-too current and consequential for SBS 
defendants. Our discussion of the shift in the SBS hypothesis, and its percolation, 
must end here, though the last chapter of this story is yet to be written.  
CONCLUSION 
The percolation problem of shifts in science is an elusive phenomenon, one that 
has not attracted enough attention to date, even with increased conversation on the 
importance, and traditional flaws, of many forensic science methods. Yet it is also a 
dangerous force when it comes to criminal convictions and appeals from those 
convictions. Defendants like Andrew Babick, Weldon Wayne Carr, Shane Ragland, 
James Earhart, and Jennifer Del Prete, and their monumentally varying fates, are 
proof of the significance of the percolation nuances we describe here.  
To truly understand when a shift in science became known, and when it 
reasonably could have been discovered—questions of utmost importance in post-
conviction litigation—requires close study of an area of science, and corresponding 
court opinions, over a period of years. In this Article, we took such close study of the 
percolation of four significant forensic science shifts, in the hopes of laying out a 
playbook of evaluation for lawyers, courts and defendants who find themselves 
grappling with such cases, in these and other forensic realms. Understanding where a 
certain case falls along the timeline of the shift in science is the first and most 
important step to any meaningful possibility of relief. Once that understanding is 
obtained, only then does the discussion shift to potential legal avenues for relief. We 
will take up that thorny subject in an upcoming article.  
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